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Most people report that they are superior to the average person on various moral traits.  The 
psychological causes and social consequences of this phenomenon have received considerable 
empirical attention. The behavioral correlates of self-perceived moral superiority, however, 
remain unknown. We present the results of two preregistered studies (Study 1, N=827; Study 
2, N=825) in which we indirectly assessed participants’ self-perceived moral superiority, and 
used two incentivized economic games to measure their engagement in moral behavior. Across 
studies, self-perceived moral superiority was unrelated to trust in others and to trustworthiness, 
as measured by the Trust Game; and unrelated to fairness, as measured by the Dictator Game. 
This pattern of findings was robust to a range of analyses, and, in both studies, Bayesian 
analyses indicated moderate support for the null over the alternative hypotheses. We interpret 
and discuss these findings, and highlight interesting avenues for future research on this topic. 
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Self-perceptions of moral superiority appear robust and relatively widespread. In 
numerous studies, majorities of people rate themselves as fairer, more trustworthy, more 
honest—more moral—than the average person (Epley & Dunning, 2000; Fetchenhauer & 
Dunning, 2006; Klein & Epley, 2016, in press; Tappin & McKay, 2017; Van Lange & 
Sedikides, 1998). Under the broader phenomenon of “self-enhancement” (Alicke & Sedikides, 
2011), past work has investigated (i) psychological explanations for (Sedikides et al., 2014; 
Tappin & McKay, 2017; Van Lange & Sedikides, 1998), and (ii) interpersonal consequences 
of (Barranti et al., 2016; Heck & Krueger, 2016) self-perceived moral superiority. There is a 
conspicuous lack of evidence, however, for how these perceptions relate to engagement in 
behaviors commonly considered moral—such as freely helping others, or reciprocating trust. 
In the present article, we report an initial investigation of this relationship. 
Self-perceived moral superiority and engagement in moral behavior 
There exists much debate over whether the prevalence of self-superiority phenomena 
is best explained by motivational or non-motivational processes (Brown, 2012; Chambers & 
Windschitl, 2004; Taylor & Brown, 1988). This offers a useful framework for speculating on 
how self-perceived moral superiority may relate to engagement in moral behavior.  
Consider people who perceive themselves to be strongly morally superior to the average 
person. As a function of their strong sense of righteousness relative to other people, these 
individuals may be motivated to behave in (moral) ways to protect this positive social 
comparison. According to various reviews, self-protection is a fundamental human motivation 
(Sedikides et al., 2015), and social comparison a common process by which people derive 
positive self-evaluation (Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Wills, 1981). Moral traits, moreover, are 
held in high regard (Van Lange & Sedikides, 1998), and morality appears to be central to 
notions of identity (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014, 2015). Individuals who possess a weaker 
sense of righteousness over the average person, then, may accordingly possess a relatively 
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weaker motivation to protect the (less positive) social comparison. This implies that self-
perceived moral superiority may be positively associated with engagement in moral behavior.  
Another motivational process that might predict a positive association is sensitivity to 
the charge of hypocrisy. Hypocrites are loathed—more so than people who are honest about 
their moral limitations (Jordan et al., 2017)—and especially so when the hypocrite considers 
themselves to be superior to others (Alicke et al., 2013). Heck and Krueger (2016) recently 
reported evidence that agents who made inaccurate claims of moral self-superiority received 
the strongest moral condemnation from observers; stronger, even, than agents who accurately 
reported being less moral than the average person. Put another way, observers punished people 
most when their self-reported moral superiority was shown to be false by their behavior. These 
findings imply added motivation for such people to behave morally, so to avoid harsh social 
censure. Consistent with this suggestion is evidence that individuals behave more prosocially 
after criticizing another person (Simpson et al., 2013). 
Some non-motivational processes, on the other hand, may lead us to expect a negative 
association between self-perceived moral superiority and engagement in moral behavior. 
Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2009, 2010) provide evidence that individuals underestimate the 
moral goodness (specifically, trustworthiness) of other people due to an informational 
asymmetry in the social environment. If person A decides to trust person B, this occasionally 
results in surprising and costly betrayal by person B. In contrast, when person A decides not to 
trust person B, this necessarily precludes person A learning that person B was, in fact, 
trustworthy. The implication is that individuals learn asymmetrically about the trustworthiness 
of other people; an asymmetry which may underlie cynicism about the moral goodness of 
others more generally (Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2010; Miller, 1999).  
Such a mechanism could help explain the prevalence of self-perceived moral 
superiority. Specifically, because the lion’s share of the variance in self-perceived moral 
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superiority likely derives from variance in how people perceive the moral goodness of others, 
rather than themselves. There is relatively limited variance in the latter—people seem largely 
in agreement that they themselves are morally virtuous (for a brief review, see Tappin & 
McKay, 2017). Taking this in conjunction with evidence that—in interdependent contexts—
individuals’ moral behavior is conditional on whether they think others will behave in kind 
(Krueger & Acevedo, 2007) implies that greater cynicism—and, thus, greater self-perceived 
moral superiority—may be associated with less moral behavior. 
Overview 
Given the uncertainty over how self-perceived moral superiority relates to engagement 
in moral behavior, we set out to investigate this relationship. Specifically, across two studies, 
we used canonical economic games as measures of moral behavior, and indirectly assessed 
how moral individuals perceived themselves to be relative to the average person.  
Methods 
 The preregistered protocols, analysis scripts and data for both studies are available on 
the Open Science Framework (OSF): https://osf.io/p42mp/. Because of their similarity, we 
present the methods and results of these studies together. 
Engagement in moral behavior 
To measure engagement in moral behavior, we used two incentivized, one-shot, 
anonymous economic games (with no deception); the Trust Game (TG, Study 1) and Dictator 
Game (DG, Study 2). These games are typically taken as providing measures of trust in others 
and trustworthiness, and fairness1, respectively (see below for descriptions of the games).  
While a general prosocial preference is likely to underpin behavior in both the TG and 
DG (Peysakhovich et al., 2014), past work suggests that trusting behavior in the TG is distinct 
                                                 
1 We refer to the DG as measuring “fairness” throughout, but note that giving in the DG is also consistent 
with altruism (Rand et al., 2016). In analyses, we find little difference in the results depending on how the 
DG measure is construed. 
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from giving in the DG (Brülhart & Usunier, 2012), and, indeed, a recent large investigation 
reported that the shared variance between trusting behavior in the TG, and behavior in the DG, 
was relatively modest at 12% (Peysakhovich et al., 2014). The relationship between DG 
behavior and trustworthy behavior in the TG was estimated to be somewhat higher—at 25% 
shared variance with behavior in the DG. In both cases, however, there was evidence of unique 
variance between the games. This suggests that inclusion of both the TG and DG provided us 
with three somewhat overlapping but distinct measures of behavior. 
We used economic games to measure engagement in moral behavior because numerous 
studies indicate that people subjectively imbue choices in these games with moral weight. For 
example, recent evidence suggests that prosocial behavior in economic games is driven by an 
explicit preference for behaving morally (Capraro & Rand, 2017), and behaving prosocially in 
such games is consistently and strongly judged to be morally superior to behaving self-
interestedly (Krueger & Acevedo, 2007; Krueger & DiDonato, 2010; Krueger et al., 2008). 
The inclusion of the TG and DG thus provided a straightforward decision environment with a 
recognizable “moral” behavior. 
Trust Game. In our TG, participants are anonymously paired and assigned the role of 
either “Trustor” or “Trustee”. Both participants are given $0.20 as a starting endowment, and 
the Trustor has the option to transfer any amount of their endowment to the Trustee (from $0.00 
to $0.20 in increments of $0.01). Any amount they transfer is tripled on its way to the Trustee, 
and the Trustee is then able to decide how much, if any, of this tripled amount they would like 
to transfer back to the Trustor (from 0 to 100%). Since the Trustor takes a risk by sending 
money to the Trustee, their decision is usually taken as a measure of trust. The Trustee, on the 
other hand, has the option to reciprocate the trust placed in them by the Trustor, by sending 
some amount of money back to the Trustor. The Trustee decision is thus usually taken as 
measure of trustworthiness (e.g., Berg et al., 1995). 
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Dictator Game. In our DG, participants are anonymously paired and assigned the role 
of either “Dictator” or “Receiver”. The Dictator is given $0.30 as a starting endowment, 
whereas the Receiver starts with nothing. The Dictator then has the option to transfer any 
amount of their endowment to the Receiver (from $0.00 to $0.30 in increments of $0.01). Since 
the Dictator’s decision is unilateral, with no possibility of reciprocation (or punishment) from 
the Receiver, they have no financial incentive to share the money. As such, the Dictator’s 
decision to share money is usually taken as a measure of fairness (more technically, inequity 
aversion, see Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). 
Self-perceived moral superiority 
 To measure self-perceived moral superiority2, we used a regression-based index of trait 
self-superiority developed and described in detail elsewhere (Heck & Krueger, 2015; Tappin 
& McKay, 2017). In brief, participants are asked to judge the extent to which 10 moral traits 
describe (i) themselves and (ii) the average person. They also rate (iii) the social desirability of 
the traits. The moral traits are presented in Table 1. Conventional measures of self-superiority 
typically compare how positive self-judgments are with respect to judgments of the average 
person. However, this overestimates the magnitude and frequency of people who harbor 
perceptions of self-superiority. The current measure accounts for this overestimation by 
estimating—and allowing the researcher to remove—a component of self-superiority that may 
be deemed “defensible” because of the uncertainty people face when making judgments of the 
average person. Below we describe the computational steps of the measure only (for more 
detail, see Heck & Krueger, 2015; Tappin & McKay, 2017). 
 
 
                                                 
2 In both preregistrations, this construct is referred to as “self-righteousness”. This was relabelled to “self-
perceived moral superiority” during the review process for better linguistic and conceptual clarity. The 
measure is identical to that described in the preregistrations. 
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Table 1. 
Positive and negative moral traits used in Studies 1 and 2 
Positive moral traits  Negative moral traits 
Honest  Insincere 
Trustworthy  Prejudiced 
Fair  Disloyal 
Respectful  Manipulative 
Principled  Deceptive 
Note. We used the five positive and five negative moral traits from Tappin and McKay 
(2017).  
 
 
Step 1. We first estimate how similar each participant’s moral self-judgments are to 
those of the average participant in the sample. To do so, we calculate the average self-judgment 
for each moral trait over all participants, and then regress these averages on the moral self-
judgments made by each individual participant. This provides a moral “coefficient of 
similarity” (unstandardized slope, b) and intercept for each participant. Higher coefficient 
values indicate that the participant is more like the average participant in the sample. We then 
compute the mean moral coefficient of similarity and intercept across participants. 
 Step 2. Next, we generate inferred moral self-judgments (I) by weighting participants 
empirically-observed moral judgments of the average person (O) by the mean coefficient of 
similarity and intercept, using the formula: 
 
𝐼  =   
𝑂
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦
  +   𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 
 
Inferred self-judgments represent self-judgments an ideal judge would have made. That 
is, a judge who perceives how morally similar people are, and uses this information to weight 
their judgment of the average person to make a more accurate self-judgment. (The basic 
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rationale is this: the more similar people are—defined here by the mean coefficient of 
similarity—the less participants’ self-judgments are expected to deviate from their judgments 
of the average person; see Heck & Krueger, 2015; Tappin & McKay, 2017). At this stage, then, 
each participant has four sets of judgments for the 10 moral traits. Their empirically observed 
self-judgments (S), judgments of the average person (O), and social desirability judgments (D), 
and the new inferred self-judgments (I) computed according to the preceding method. 
 Step 3. In the final step, we regress S, O, and I on D judgments for each participant. 
This produces three unstandardized slopes per participant. These slopes express how well 
moral trait desirability predicts their (i) moral self-judgments (bSD), (ii) judgments of the 
average person (bOD), and (iii) inferred self-judgments (bID). In other words, bSD describes the 
positivity of participants’ moral self-perception, bOD describes the positivity of participants’ 
perception of the average person’s morality, and bID describes the positivity of the participants’ 
moral self-perception presupposing they were an ideal judge.   
The index of self-perceived moral superiority is computed as the difference between 
bSD and bID (specifically, bSD - bID). This index represents self-perceived moral superiority, but 
is more conservative than conventional measures because it partitions out a “defensible” 
component of self-superiority (which is defined by the difference between bID and bOD)
3. 
Samples 
 We sought to recruit 824 participants in each study, providing approximately N=412 in 
each role. Participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Amir & Rand, 2012; 
Arechar et al., in press; Chandler & Shapiro, 2016; Rand, 2012). Sample sizes were determined 
via power analyses: Our smallest effect size of interest was r=.15, which we required N=343 
to achieve 80% power (=.05) to detect in each of our three primary linear regression analyses 
                                                 
3 We report correlations between the “defensible” component of self-perceived moral superiority and 
economic game behavior in the SI (section 5). 
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(Faul et al., 2009). We deliberately oversampled by approximately 20% to guard against power 
loss due to planned data exclusions. Sample sizes after data collection were: Study 1 N=827 
(50.18% female, Mage=38.35 SDage=12.97; Trustor N=413, Trustee N=414), Study 2 N=825 
(55.27% female, Mage=37.50 SDage=12.62; Dictator N=413, Receiver N=412).  
Procedure 
 The procedure in both studies was substantively identical, and we recruited separate 
samples in each case (Study 1 participants were identified via their unique Mechanical Turk 
ID and blocked from participating in Study 2).  All participants provided informed consent, 
before being assigned their role in their respective economic game (Study 1: TG, trustor or 
trustee, Study 2: DG, dictator or receiver, role assignments were counterbalanced). All 
participants then completed (i) the trait judgment task, and (ii) the economic game 
(counterbalanced), except for those assigned the role of receiver in the DG. These participants 
always completed the DG first, and then completed an unrelated task (receivers are entirely 
passive and so collecting their trait judgments was unnecessary).  
In the trait judgment task, participants were presented with the list of 10 moral traits 
alongside 20 additional, nonmoral filler traits (inclusion of the nonmoral traits allowed us to 
replicate the primary results reported by Tappin & McKay, 2017; see SI section 6). Participants 
were asked to judge (i) the extent to which each trait described themselves, (ii) the extent to 
which each trait described the average person, and (iii) the social desirability of each trait. 
Participants rated all 30 traits according to either (i), (ii), or (iii), before moving onto the next 
set of ratings, and the order of these three sets of judgments was counterbalanced across 
participants. The presentation order of the traits themselves was randomized in each rating set 
and for each participant. Rating judgments for the self and the average person were provided 
on a seven-point scale, ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much so). Social desirability 
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judgments were also provided on a seven-point scale, ranging from -3 (Very undesirable) to 
+3 (Very desirable).  
In the economic games, participants read instructions and completed three 
comprehension questions assessing their understanding of the payoff structure. Failure to 
answer all three comprehension questions correctly after two attempts resulted in participants 
being prevented from completing the survey. After these questions, we revealed which role the 
participant had been assigned, and they made their decision. We informed them that pairs of 
decisions would be combined and their bonus calculated and awarded after the survey had 
concluded (which was true). In addition to bonuses, all participants received a base fee of $0.50 
for taking part. At the end of the survey, participants completed simple demographic questions, 
provided feedback on their experience, and were asked whether they had previously taken part 
in a similar decision task. 
Results 
 All analyses were conducted in the R environment (R Core Team, 2016). Only dictators 
are used in Study 2 analyses. Table 2 displays descriptive statistics. 
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Table 2. 
Descriptive statistics from Studies 1 and 2  
  Study 1 (TG)  Study 2 (DG) 
  Slope (b)  Intercept  Slope (b)  Intercept 
 M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Components             
 RSD 0.74 0.27  0.98 1.15  0.76 0.26  0.90 1.09 
 ROD 0.19 0.34  3.13 1.47  0.18 0.36  3.15 1.50 
 RID 0.22 0.41  4.38 1.75  0.21 0.41  4.14 1.72 
             
  M  SD  M  SD 
Index of SPMS 0.52  0.41  0.55  0.44 
             
Transfer amount            
 Trustors (c) 13.38  7.28  -  - 
 Trustees (%) 35.24  24.44  -  - 
 Dictators (c) -  -  10.39  6.96 
Note. Components are within-participant regressions involved in computing the index of 
self-perceived moral superiority, according to the procedure outlined in the methods 
section. TG = Trust Game, DG = Dictator Game; R = regression; S = self-judgments; D = 
desirability judgments; O = other (average person) judgments; I = inferred-self judgments; 
SPMS = self-perceived moral superiority (i.e., bSD – bID); M = mean; c = cents. Study 1 N 
= 736, Study 2 N = 369. 
 
Data exclusions 
All data exclusions were preregistered. Before computing the self-perceived moral 
superiority index, we excluded responses that contained duplicate IP addresses (Study 1: n=8, 
0.97%, Study 2: n=2, 0.48%) and/or one or more failed attention checks (there were three 
embedded in the trait judgment task) (Study 1: n=28, 3.39%, Study 2: n=22, 5.33%). We then 
proceeded to compute the index as outlined in Steps 1-3 in the methods section. During Step 
1, those participants who responded uniformly on moral self-judgments were excluded (Study 
1: n=0, 0%, Study 2: n=4, 0.97%), because the regression analyses in this step require at least 
some variation. During Step 3, for the same reason, we additionally excluded participants who 
responded uniformly on moral judgments of the average person (Study 1: n=54, 6.53%, Study 
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2: n=19, 4.60%), and/or social desirability judgments (Study 1: n=1, 0.12%, Study 2: n=4, 
0.97%). Sample sizes for the primary analyses were thus, Study 1: Trustors N=369, Trustees 
N=367, Study 2: Dictators N=369.  
Self-perceived moral superiority and trust in others 
 Preregistered analyses. We first regressed trustor decisions on self-perceived moral 
superiority scores (Figure 1). Self-perceived moral superiority was trivially related to transfer 
amount, model summary: F (1, 367) = 0.14, p=.706, R=.02 [predictor summary: b=-0.34, 
se=0.89, t=-0.38]. Because the decision data were non-normally distributed, we also conducted 
a Spearman’s rank correlation with the same two variables. The results mirrored the parametric 
analysis: rs=-.05, p=.326. Magnitude of self-perceived moral superiority was not meaningfully 
associated with trusting behavior in the TG. 
 Exploratory analyses. We conducted several exploratory analyses to test the 
robustness of this conclusion. First, we dichotomized the trustor decisions by assigning them a 
value of 1 if they were greater than the median transfer amount of 15c, and a value of 0 if they 
were equal to or less than this amount. A total of 179 (48.51%) participants transferred greater 
than the median amount of 15c. A binary logistic regression predicting the probability of an 
above median transfer, based on self-perceived moral superiority scores, corroborated the 
preregistered analyses: Odds Ratio (OR)=0.90, 95% CI [0.55, 1.46], p=.669 (Figure 1). That 
is, self-perceived moral superiority was not meaningfully associated with the probability of 
transferring greater than the median transfer amount. For all DVs, we also explored whether 
prior experience with the games was masking an association between self-perceived moral 
superiority and decision behavior in our sample (it wasn’t) (cf. Chandler et al., 2015; see SI 
section 2 for these analyses).  
Given these results, we sought to quantify the relative strength of evidence in favor of 
the null hypothesis. We conducted a Kendall’s tau Bayesian correlation analysis using JASP 
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software (JASP Team, 2017). Under a uniformly distributed prior, we obtained a Bayes Factor 
(BF) of 8.23 in favor of the null hypothesis. That is, the BF indicated moderate support for the 
null over the alternative hypothesis. The BF in favor of the null remained moderate-to-strong 
over a wide range of priors (see SI section 1). The results of the exploratory analyses support 
those of the preregistered analyses. 
Self-perceived moral superiority and trustworthiness 
Preregistered analyses. As before, we began by regressing trustee decisions on self-
perceived moral superiority scores (Figure 1). Self-perceived moral superiority was trivially 
related to back-transfer amount: F (1, 365) = 0.04, p=.851, R=.01 [b=0.60, se=3.17, t=0.19]. 
Because the decision data were again non-normally distributed, we followed with a Spearman’s 
rank correlation. The results mirrored the parametric analysis: rs=-.004, p=.931. Magnitude of 
self-perceived moral superiority was not meaningfully associated with trustworthiness 
behavior in the TG. 
Exploratory analyses. Once again, we conducted several exploratory analyses to 
investigate the robustness of this conclusion. We first dichotomized the trustee decisions by 
assigning them a value of 1 if they were greater than the median back-transfer amount of 50%, 
and a value of 0 if they were less than this amount. A total of 55 (14.99%) participants back-
transferred greater than the median amount of 50%. A binary logistic regression predicting the 
probability of an above median back-transfer, based on self-perceived moral superiority scores, 
corroborated the preregistered analyses: OR=0.64 [0.31, 1.32], p=.233 (Figure 1). That is, self-
perceived moral superiority was not meaningfully associated with the probability of an above 
median back-transfer. As before, a Kendall’s tau Bayesian correlation analysis conducted in 
JASP (uniformly distributed prior) returned a BF of 14.58 in favor of the null hypothesis. That 
is, the BF indicated strong support for the null over the alternative hypothesis. The BF remained 
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moderate-to-strong over a wide range of priors (see SI section 1). The results of the exploratory 
analyses thus support those of the preregistered analyses. 
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Figure 1 | Relationship between self-perceived moral superiority and transfer amounts in 
studies 1 (A, B) and 2 (C). Scatter points are raw data with slight jitter for visibility and 
the shaded regions denote 95% confidence intervals. (A) Left panel: Preregistered analysis 
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regressing trustor transfer amount on self-perceived moral superiority (b = -0.34, se = 0.89). 
Right panel: Exploratory binary logistic regression analysis of the probability that trustor 
transfer was greater than the median transfer amount (15c), based on self-perceived moral 
superiority scores (OR = 0.90 [0.55, 1.46]). N = 369. (B) Left panel: Preregistered analysis 
regressing trustee back-transfer amount on self-perceived moral superiority (b = 0.60, se = 
3.17). Right panel: Exploratory binary logistic regression analysis of the probability that trustee 
back-transfer was greater than the median back-transfer amount (50%), based on self-perceived 
moral superiority scores (OR = 0.64 [0.31, 1.32]). N = 367. (C) Left panel: Preregistered 
analysis regressing dictator transfer amount on self-perceived moral superiority (b = -0.62, se 
= 0.83). Right panel: Exploratory binary logistic regression analysis of the probability that 
dictator transfer was fair (15c), based on self-perceived moral superiority scores (OR = 0.72 
[0.45, 1.15]). N = 369. 
 
Self-perceived moral superiority and fairness 
Preregistered analyses. We began by regressing dictator decisions on self-perceived 
moral superiority scores (Figure 1). Self-perceived moral superiority was trivially related to 
transfer amount: F (1, 367) = 0.57, p=.452, R=.04 [b=-0.62, se=0.83, t=-0.75]. Because the 
decision data were non-normally distributed, we conducted a Spearman’s rank correlation with 
the same two variables. The results mirrored the parametric analysis: rs=-.05, p=.345. We 
quantified the relative strength of evidence in favor of the null by conducting a Bayesian 
correlation analysis in JASP. We preregistered our intention to conduct a Pearson’s rho 
Bayesian correlation, but, given the severe non-normality of the decision data, a Kendall’s tau 
Bayesian correlation is more appropriate. For transparency, we report both. The BFrho was 
11.57, and BFtau was 8.38 in favor of the null hypothesis (uniformly distributed priors). Both 
indicated moderate-to-strong support for the null over the alternative hypothesis. In SI section 
1, we report BFtau over a wide range of priors (it remained moderate-to-strong in favor of the 
null).  
Next, to account for the fact that transfer amounts of greater than 15c—that is, greater 
than half the dictator’s endowment—are technically “unfair” (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), rather 
reflecting altruism or “hyper-fairness” (Henrich et al., 2006; Rand et al., 2016), we repeated 
the above analyses with a truncated sample of dictators—excluding those who transferred 
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greater than 15c (Nexcluded=15, 4.07%). The truncated analyses thus tested whether self-
perceived moral superiority was associated with fairness behavior, where unfair behavior was 
defined as inequity in favor of oneself (i.e., the dictator). The pattern of results was the same 
as in the full sample, regression: F (1, 352) = 0.87, p=.351, R=.05 [b=-0.73, se=0.78, t=-0.93], 
Spearman’s rank correlation: rs=-.06, p=.235, Bayesian correlation: BFrho=9.75 and BFtau=5.88 
in favor of the null (uniform priors; BFtau robust over a range of priors, see SI section 1). 
Magnitude of self-perceived moral superiority was not meaningfully associated with fairness 
behavior in the DG. 
Exploratory analyses. To check robustness, we dichotomized the dictator decisions 
by assigning them a value of 1 if they were equal to 15c, and a value of 0 if they were greater 
than or less than this amount. Fairness was thus strictly defined as rejection of inequity in favor 
of either oneself (dictator) or the other person (receiver). A total of 187 (50.68%) participants 
split the money fairly, transferring exactly 15c. A binary logistic regression predicting the 
probability of fair transfer, based on self-perceived moral superiority scores, corroborated the 
preregistered analyses: OR=0.72 [0.45, 1.15], p=.174 (Figure 1). That is, self-perceived moral 
superiority did not meaningfully predict the probability of a fair transfer. The results of the 
exploratory analyses are consistent with those of the preregistered analyses. 
Discussion 
 We investigated how self-perceived moral superiority related to behavior in two 
canonical economic games—the Trust Game (TG) and Dictator Game (DG). Across two 
studies, self-perceived moral superiority was not associated with magnitude of trust in others, 
trustworthiness, or fairness, as these behaviors are measured in the games. This pattern of 
results was robust to a variety of analyses, and, for each of the three dependent variables, 
Bayesian analyses indicated relatively strong support for the null vs. alternative hypothesis.  
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The findings are inconsistent with our hypotheses: that self-perceived moral superiority 
would be associated with (i) more, or with (ii) less, moral behavior. Whereas some evidence 
suggests that perceptions of nonmoral self-superiority are associated with (Blanton et al., 1999; 
Heck & Krueger, 2015), and possibly facilitate (O’Mara & Gaertner, 2017) behavioral 
performance, we found that self-perceived moral superiority was not associated with behavior 
in canonical economic games—in which moral motivation appears reliably engaged (Capraro 
& Rand, 2017), and where morally superior decisions are readily discerned (Krueger & 
Acevedo, 2007; Krueger & DiDonato, 2010; Krueger et al., 2008).  
Why was self-perceived moral superiority unrelated to behavior in the games? One 
explanation is that our measure was domain general. That is, participants provided judgments 
for a range of moral traits, which fed into a single score indexing their self-perceived moral 
superiority. It is possible that superiority perceived on specific moral traits is associated with 
behavior representative of those traits, but that our domain general measure obscured these 
relationships. We examined this possibility by computing raw difference scores between 
participants’ self-judgments and their judgments of the average person for the traits 
“trustworthy” and “fair” only, and correlating these scores with trustee decisions, and dictator 
decisions, respectively (SI section 3). These coefficients were also trivial in size (|rs| <.03)—
suggesting that the domain-generality of our measure does not account for the current pattern 
of results. 
An interesting and related question is whether individuals’ moral self-perception—not 
their perceived superiority over others—was associated with absolute magnitude of monetary 
transfer in the games. Exploratory correlations suggested a small but consistently positive 
association between moral self-perception (bSD) and transfer amount across dependent 
variables; trust in others (rs=.12), trustworthiness (rs=.15), and fairness (rs=.06). We observed 
some evidence for self-knowledge—those people who had a more positive view of their own 
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morality tended to transfer more money to their partners. This is consistent with prior evidence 
that self-perceptions are at least somewhat diagnostic of behavior/reality (Epley & Dunning, 
2000; Vazire & Carlson, 2010), and that self-reported traits correlate with prosociality in 
economic games (Hillbig et al., 2013). This raises the question of what role moral judgments 
of the average person had in participants’ behavior. 
It is plausible that the magnitude of self-perceived moral superiority is driven primarily 
by variance in how people view the morality of other people, not themselves (cf. Tappin & 
McKay, 2017), and that greater moral cynicism about others is associated with lower 
engagement in certain types of moral behavior (Krueger & Acevedo, 2007). This provides one 
explanation for why the above positive associations between moral self-perception and 
behavior did not emerge for self-perceived moral superiority. Specifically, because they were 
cancelled out by the cynicism disproportionately driving the latter.  
We subjected this speculation to the data. First, comparing the shared variance between 
self-perceived moral superiority scores and both (i) moral self-perceptions (bSD), and (ii) 
perceptions of the average person’s morality (bOD), revealed that the latter explained, on 
average, 64% variance in the scores, whereas the former accounted for less than a quarter of 
this amount (SI section 4). Second, perceptions of the average person’s morality were weakly 
but consistently positively related to transfer amount across dependent variables; trust in others 
(rs=.11), trustworthiness (rs=.12), and fairness (rs=.08). In other words, self-perceived moral 
superiority was mainly driven by how individuals viewed the morality of other people, not 
themselves, and greater moral cynicism about these others tended to be associated with lower 
monetary transfers. This supports our speculation on both counts, and is consistent with two 
areas of prior work: the first, that observers interpret expressions of self-superiority as 
condemnation of others, rather than egregious self-flattery (Van Damme et al., 2016; Van 
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Damme et al., 2017), and, the second, that individuals condition their behavior in these games 
on whether they think others will behave in kind (Krueger & Acevedo, 2007).  
Based on this, we suggest that, despite the robust observation that most people rate 
themselves as morally superior to the average person, this phenomenon has limited predictive 
validity due to the seemingly opposed behavioral influences of self- and other-perception that 
comprise its measurement. That said, we note there is mixed evidence over whether economic 
games are valid analogues of behavior in the real world (Benz & Meier, 2008; Fehr & 
Leibbrandt, 2011; Franzen & Pointner, 2013; Galizzi & Navarro-Martinez, 2017). It is thus 
reasonable to ask whether our results would generalize to more ecologically valid cases of 
moral behavior. This represents an interesting avenue for future research. Furthermore, there 
is evidence that East Asian samples do not report self-superiority perceptions to the same extent 
as Western samples (Heine & Hamamura, 2007); indicating our results may differ along these 
specific cultural lines.  
We do expect, however, that our results will be robust to variations in the economic 
game environment—in particular, changes to the size of the monetary stakes. Indeed, meta-
analytic reviews indicate that game behavior tends to differ rather minimally over variance in 
stake size (Engel, 2011; Johnson & Mislin, 2011). In addition, both our measure of self-
perceived moral superiority, and our analytic approach, were comprehensive—comprising a 
variety of validated moral traits (see Tappin & McKay, 2017), and a range of robustness 
checks, respectively. We expect conceptual replications that use alternative measures of moral 
superiority and alternative analytic approaches to produce similar results to those we observed 
here. We have no reason to believe that the results depend on other characteristics of the 
participants, materials, or contexts (Simons et al., 2017). 
Here we investigated how self-perceived moral superiority related to moral behavior as 
measured in canonical economic games. We observed robust evidence that self-perceived 
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moral superiority is not associated with magnitude of trust in others, trustworthiness, or 
fairness, as defined by the games; a result seemingly produced by the opposite behavioral 
manifestations of (i) self-knowledge and (ii) cynicism about the morality of the average person. 
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Supplementary Information: 
Investigating the relationship between self-perceived moral superiority and 
moral behavior using economic games 
Section 1 
Bayesian analyses 
 All Bayesian analyses were Kendall’s tau Bayesian correlation pairs conducted in 
JASP. Below we report the robustness checks (displayed graphically) for each Bayesian 
analysis reported in the main text. 
 
Self-perceived moral superiority and trust in others 
 
Figure S1 | Bayes Factor robustness check: Trustors. Relative support for the null over 
alternative hypothesis as a function of prior width. The BF indicates moderate to strong 
support over a range of priors. 
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Self-perceived moral superiority and trustworthiness 
 
 
Figure S2 | Bayes Factor robustness check: Trustees. Relative support for the null over 
alternative hypothesis as a function of prior width. The BF indicates moderate to strong 
support over a range of priors.  
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Self-perceived moral superiority and fairness 
 
 
Figure S3 | Bayes Factor robustness check: Dictators. Relative support for the null over 
alternative hypothesis as a function of prior width. The BF indicates moderate to strong 
support over a range of priors.  
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Self-perceived moral superiority and fairness (truncated sample) 
 
 
Figure S4 | Bayes Factor robustness check: Dictators (truncated). Relative support for the 
null over alternative hypothesis as a function of prior width. The BF indicates moderate to 
strong support over a range of priors.  
 
Section 2 
Previous experience with economic games 
For all DVs (trustor transfers, trustee transfers, dictator transfers), we explored 
whether prior experience with the games was masking an association between self-perceived 
moral superiority and decision behavior (cf. Chandler et al., 2015). Below we present these 
analyses in the order of DVs present in the main text.  
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Excluding trustors who reported having previously seen the TG (Nexcluded=125, 
33.88%), and repeating the preregistered regression analysis, corroborated the preregistered 
and other exploratory analyses: F (1, 242) = 0.41, p=.522, R=.04 [b=-0.66, se=1.03, t=-0.64]. 
Similarly, excluding trustees who reported having previously seen the TG (Nexcluded=114, 
31.06%), and repeating the preregistered regression analysis revealed similar results to those 
in the full (nonnaive) sample: F (1, 251) = 0.01, p=.929, R=.01 [b=0.35, se=3.89, t=0.09]. 
Finally, excluding dictators who reported having previously seen the DG (Nexcluded=140, 
37.94%), and repeating the preregistered regression analysis, produced the same pattern of 
results as those in the full (nonnaive) sample: F (1, 227) = 0.35, p=.555, R=.04 [b=-0.64, 
se=1.08, t=-0.59]. All these exploratory analyses are consistent with the preregistered and 
exploratory analyses reported in the main text; specifically, indicating that prior experience 
with the economic games was not masking an association between our variables of interest. 
 
Section 3 
The domain-generality of our measure 
 To explore the possibility that the domain-generality of the self-perceived moral 
superiority measure was obscuring any relationship between perceived superiority on specific 
moral traits (e.g., trustworthiness, or fairness) and behavior representative of those traits, we 
first computed difference scores between participants’ given self-judgments (s) and their 
judgments of the average person (o) for the traits “trustworthy” and “fair” only. We then 
conducted Spearman’s rank correlations between these scores and trustee decisions (Study 1), 
and dictator decisions (Study 2), respectively. Perceived superiority on the trait “trustworthy” 
was trivially related to trustee back-transfer amount: rs = -.03, p = .588. Similarly, perceived 
superiority on the trait “fair” was trivially related to dictator transfer amount: rs = -.002, p = 
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.973. These results mirror those of the preregistered analyses using the self-perceived moral 
superiority measure. 
Section 4 
Explaining variance in self-perceived moral superiority 
 We explored whether self-perceived moral superiority scores were better explained by 
(i) moral self-perceptions (bSD), or (ii) perceptions of the average person’s morality (bOD). 
Separately correlating (i) and (ii) with self-perceived moral superiority scores indicated that 
the latter explained, on average, 64.20% variance in these scores (Study 1: r = -.79, p <.001, 
62.16% variance explained, Study 2: r = -.81, p <.001, 66.24% variance explained). Whereas, 
the former accounted for less than a quarter of this amount (average variance explained: 
14.06%, Study 1: r = .35, p <.001, 12.35% variance explained, Study 2: r = .40, p <.001, 
15.77% variance explained).  
Section 5 
Defensible self-perceived moral superiority and economic game behavior 
 We explored whether the “defensible” component of self-perceived moral 
superiority—as given by the regression-based index—was associated with behavior in the 
economic games. This component is defined by bID – bOD; or, the amount of self-superiority 
that may be justified by the fact that individuals have limited information about the average 
person (Heck & Krueger, 2015; Tappin & McKay, 2017). Defensible self-perceived moral 
superiority was weakly but positively correlated with transfer amount for those in the role of 
trustor [rs = .11, p=.034], trustee [rs = .12, p=.023], and dictator [rs = .08, p=.110]. This 
provides some intuitive rationale for labeling the index “defensible”, but we emphasize that 
caution must be used when interpreting the meaning of these results given the lack of a priori 
predictions we had about these associations. 
Section 6 
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Replication of Tappin & McKay (2017) 
 We included 20 nonmoral filler traits in the trait judgment task—10 of which pertained 
to the domain of agency, and 10 to the domain of sociability (also drawn from Tappin & 
McKay, 2017)—and we were thus able to replicate the primary results reported in Tappin and 
McKay (2017) (Table S1 displays the full list of traits). Specifically, in their study they found 
that self-perceived moral superiority—measured using the same regression-based index as in 
the current studies—was larger in magnitude, and more frequent, than perceived superiority in 
nonmoral domains of social perception. Thus, in the following section we reproduce the 
primary analyses reported in Tappin and McKay (2017) (p.6, para beginning: “This indicates 
that irrational self-enhancement is strongest in the moral domain.”)4. For consistency, we use 
their terminology to refer to perceived superiority (that is, “irrational self-enhancement”).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Note: we replicate the magnitude and frequency analyses of Tappin and McKay (2017) only, not the 
analyses with self-esteem (since we did not collect self-esteem data in the current studies). Also, 
sample N’s differ from those reported in the preregistered analyses because, prior to replicating 
Tappin & McKay (2017), we had to additionally exclude uniform responders in the nonmoral trait 
domains. 
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Table S1. 
Full list of traits used in Studies 1 and 2 
Domain Positive traits  Negative traits 
Morality Honest  Insincere 
 Trustworthy  Prejudiced 
 Fair  Disloyal 
 Respectful  Manipulative 
 Principled  Deceptive 
Agency Hard-working  Lazy 
 Knowledgeable  Undedicated 
 Competent  Unintelligent 
 Creative  Unmotivated 
 Determined  Illogical 
Sociability Sociable  Cold 
 Playful  Disagreeable 
 Warm  Rude 
 Family-orientated  Humorless 
 Easy-going  Uptight 
Note. Traits were identical to those used in Tappin & McKay 
(2017), except that the trait “playful” replaced “cooperative”. 
 
 
Irrational self-enhancement. We first investigated the magnitude of irrational self-
enhancement in each trait domain by examining how well trait desirability predicted actual 
self-judgments (mean bSD) vs. inferred self-judgments (mean bID). In both studies, replicating 
Tappin and McKay (2017), paired t-tests revealed that magnitude of irrational self-
enhancement was largest in the moral domain, Study 1: Morality (0.74 vs. 0.23), t (727) = 
33.52, p <.001, Cohens d = 1.24 95% Confidence Interval [1.15, 1.34], Agency (0.73 vs. 0.28), 
t (727) = 24.50, p <.001, d = 0.91 [0.82, 0.99], and Sociability (0.61 vs. 0.52), t (727) = 4.17, 
p <.001, d = 0.15 [0.08, 0.23]; Study 2: Morality (0.76 vs. 0.21), t (361) = 23.60, p <.001, d = 
1.24 [1.10, 1.38], Agency (0.72 vs. 0.28), t (361) = 17.10, p <.001, d = 0.90 [0.78, 1.02], and 
Sociability (0.63 vs. 0.49), t (361) = 5.49, p <.001, d = 0.29 [0.18, 0.39]. 
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 We confirmed statistically that Morality was the largest by computing the difference 
measure (bSD – bID) for each trait domain, and conducting paired t-tests between trait domains. 
In both studies, replicating Tappin and McKay (2017), the moral domain comprised the largest 
magnitude of irrational self-enhancement, Study 1: Morality (0.52) vs. Agency (0.46), t (727) 
= 4.00, p <.001, d = 0.15 [0.08, 0.22], and vs. Sociability (0.09), t (727) = 25.36, p <.001, d = 
0.94 [0.85, 1.03]; Study 2: Morality (0.55) vs. Agency (0.44), t (361) = 5.04, p <.001, d = 0.27 
[0.16, 0.37], and vs. Sociability (0.15), t (361) = 17.16, p <.001, d = 0.90 [0.78, 1.02]. 
 Finally, corroborating the analysis of magnitude, and again replicating Tappin and 
McKay (2017), McNemar’s Tests showed that more individuals irrationally self-enhanced (bSD 
> bID) in the moral domain than in either of the nonmoral domains, Study 1: Morality (n = 659, 
90.52%) vs. Agency (n = 611, 83.93%), 2 (df = 1, N = 728) = 26.94, p <.001, and vs. 
Sociability (n = 396, 54.40%), 2 (df = 1, N = 728) = 249.61, p <.001; Study 2: Morality (n = 
331, 91.44%) vs. Agency (n = 302, 83.43%), 2 (df = 1, N = 362) = 16.68, p <.001, and vs. 
Sociability (n = 214, 59.12%), 2 (df = 1, N = 362) = 109.40, p <.001.  
 
